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Abstract
Background
While formal reporting, surveillance, and response structures remain essential to protecting
public health, a new generation of freely accessible, online, and real-time informatics tools
for disease tracking are expanding the ability to raise earlier public awareness of emerging
disease threats. The rationale for this study is to test the hypothesis that the HealthMap in-
formatics tools can complement epidemiological data captured by traditional surveillance
monitoring systems for meningitis due to Neisseria meningitides (N.meningitides) by
highlighting severe transmissible disease activity and outbreaks in the United States.
Methods
Annual analyses of N.meningitides disease alerts captured by HealthMap were compared
to epidemiological data captured by the Centers for Disease Control’s Active Bacterial Core
surveillance (ABCs) for N.meningitides. Morbidity and mortality case reports were mea-
sured annually from 2010 to 2013 (HealthMap) and 2005 to 2012 (ABCs).
Findings
HealthMap N.meningitidesmonitoring captured 80-90% of alerts as diagnosed N.menin-
gitides, 5-20% of alerts as suspected cases, and 5-10% of alerts as related news articles.
HealthMap disease alert activity for emerging disease threats related to N.meningitides
were in agreement with patterns identified historically using traditional surveillance systems.
HealthMap’s strength lies in its ability to provide a cumulative “snapshot” of weak signals
that allows for rapid dissemination of knowledge and earlier public awareness of potential
outbreak status while formal testing and confirmation for specific serotypes is ongoing by
public health authorities.
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406 May 20, 2015 1 / 17
a11111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Ahmed SS, Oviedo-Orta E, Mekaru SR,
Freifeld CC, Tougas G, Brownstein JS (2015)
Surveillance for Neisseria meningitidis Disease
Activity and Transmission Using Information
Technology. PLoS ONE 10(5): e0127406.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406
Academic Editor: Chris T. Bauch, University of
Waterloo, CANADA
Received: December 22, 2014
Accepted: April 15, 2015
Published: May 20, 2015
Copyright: © 2015 Ahmed et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the paper.
Funding: Drs. Brownstein, Mekaru, and Freifeld are
supported by grant 5 R01 LM010812-04 from the
National Library of Medicine. The funder had no role
in study design, data collection and analysis, decision
to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. No other
sources of funding have supported this work. Novartis
provided support in the form of salaries for authors
(SSA, EOO, GT), but did not have any additional role
in the study design, data collection and analysis,
decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Conclusions
The underreporting of disease cases in internet-based data streaming makes inadequate
any comparison to epidemiological trends illustrated by the more comprehensive ABCs net-
work published by the Centers for Disease Control. However, the expected delays in com-
piling confirmatory reports by traditional surveillance systems (at the time of writing, ABCs
data for 2013 is listed as being provisional) emphasize the helpfulness of real-time internet-
based data streaming to quickly fill gaps including the visualization of modes of disease
transmission in outbreaks for better resource and action planning. HealthMap can also con-
tribute as an internet-based monitoring system to provide real-time channel for patients to
report intervention-related failures.
Introduction
Neisseria meningitidis (N.meningitidis) is a human pathogen that spreads between individuals
through direct contact with respiratory secretions [1]. The bacteria can cause septicemia, pneu-
monia, and meningitis. N.meningitidis strains can be categorized, based on the composition of
the bacteria’s capsule, into 13 different serogroups of which five are responsible for the great
majority of invasive disease (serogroups A, B, C, W, and Y) [2]. Up to 14% of meningococcal
infected individuals die [2,3] and among the survivors, up to 20% have serious sequelae includ-
ing hearing loss, limb amputation, and neurologic disability [4]. Due to the disease’s rapid pro-
gression (< 24–48 hours), serious sequelae, and potential for person-to-person spread, a single
case of meningococcal disease will trigger immediate and increasing media attention during
which public health officials are working to avoid panic, to identify whether there is an out-
break, and to generate an effective response to treat disease and prevent further transmission.
Recently, two United States (US) universities have experienced serogroup B strain outbreaks
that were widely reported by both traditional media and internet-based news reporting. The
widespread adoption of more sophisticated information technology has increased public
awareness of potentially serious diseases as seen during the emergence and global spread of the
2009 pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus [5]. While formal reporting, surveillance, and re-
sponse structures remain essential to protecting public health, a new generation of online, free-
ly accessible, and real-time disease surveillance-monitoring tools have become available. These
tools complement and expand existing public health professionals’ capacities to detect weak
signals and to raise earlier concerns regarding emerging diseases [6–8]. In this report, we used
the HealthMap informatics tool [9] to investigate the burden of “meningitis” that can be cap-
tured in the US. We aim to test the hypothesis that HealthMap complements data captured by
traditional surveillance and provides insights related to the mode of disease transmission linked
to emerging outbreaks.
Methods
HealthMap
HealthMap (http://www.healthmap.org/) is a multistream real-time surveillance platform that
continually aggregates reports on new and ongoing infectious disease outbreaks. The system
performs extraction, categorization, filtration, and integration of these reports, facilitating
knowledge management and earlier awareness of potential outbreak status [10].
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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HealthMap system capabilities. The HealthMap automated text processing system pro-
ceeds in four stages: (1) Acquisition (2) Characterization (3) Filtering, and (4) Clustering.
Trained public health analysts are employed to review content and correct misclassifications.
Finally, the correctly classified content is used to improve the automated algorithms through a
training feedback loop.
The first step is data acquisition. The system collects data via five main channels: news
aggregators (such as Google News, Yahoo News, Moreover); specific Real-time Simple Syndi-
cation (RSS) feeds including WHO (World Health Organization), OIE (Office International
des Epizooties/World Organisation for Animal Health), and others; e-mail subscriptions
(GPHIN [Global Public Health Intelligence Network (developed by Health Camada)],
ProMED, etc); custom-parsed HTML (HyperText Markup Language) scraping or CSV
(Comma-separated Values)/XML (Extensible Markup Language) feeds; and user submitted re-
ports. The framework allows one to add a new feed through a custom PHP (Personal Home
Page Tools) Hypertext Preprocessor class where the feed-specific code fetches the content,
parses it, and then extracts a set of common fields.
In the second step, the common outputs of the feed framework then pass to the characteri-
zation engine where we extract disease and location entities, flag the report as not-disease-relat-
ed by rule (if applicable), and identify the source publication. This module loads large
dictionaries of terms into memory and then matches them against the input text using a rapid
matching algorithm. Algorithm performance is linear on the size of the input text and memory
consumption is linear on the size of the dictionary. Under some conditions, the characteriza-
tion module may make calls back to the acquisition module to request additional input text
from the source. The dictionaries currently support identification of about 250 diseases.
HealthMap has an internal location database of over 25,000 locations. The characterization en-
gine generally assigns countries or first level administrative units; analysts generally change
these to cities, hospitals, or schools, if that level of specificity is warranted.
Once disease and location are assigned, the document then passes to a document-level
Bayesian filtering module (third step). The filter breaks the document into unigrams, digrams,
trigrams (and tetragrams in some languages), and then computes a likelihood score based on
training data from tens of thousands of previously recorded documents. It then assigns the
document to one of five categories based on relevance; documents falling in the two most rele-
vant categories, Breaking News and Warning, are posted to the map, whereas documents in the
Old News, Context, or Not Disease Related categories are hidden from the map. These alerts
are retained in the database for use in future research.
The last step in the automated pipeline is document clustering to group duplicate reports to-
gether. The clustering module compares the given document to each previously collected docu-
ment over a fixed time window, and computes a similarity score based on the texts and
classification outputs. If the maximum score is above a set threshold, the new document is as-
signed as a “child” of the previous document, and hidden from the map. The similarity calcula-
tion is based on six factors: (1) character-level headline comparison; (2) word-level headline
comparison (fraction of words in common, with inverse term frequency taken into account); (3)
disease and place comparison from the output of the named-entity extraction engine; (4) coun-
try-level comparison (i.e., if the two reports have different locations within the same country)
boost similarity score somewhat; (5) timestamp (reports closer in time are more likely to be simi-
lar); and (6) filter category comparison based on the output of the Bayesian filtering module.
Following automated processing, HealthMap alerts are posted directly to the public map,
partner pages, and RSS feeds. However, at the same time, a team of trained analysts will review
all incoming data and correct misclassifications and assign additional higher resolution meta-
data classifications. For these curation tasks, a feature-rich analyst dashboard allows users to
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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search, review and annotate the alerts. For example, analysts can highlight text in a report and
assign a named entity category such as executing a geocoding query with the highlighted text
and bringing up a map for use in assigning precise location to a report. The analyst corrections
feed back into the machine learning algorithms and improve the automated content analysis.
Case counts data is entered and additional tags are assigned when relevant. The current list of
tags includes such diverse topics as schools, healthcare facilities, sports-associated, recall (of a
product), and cruise.
HealthMap data sources. HealthMap uses a large variety of inputs to detect outbreak
news displayed on the main web page, to produce password protected sites for partners with
sensitive data, and to do research on novel disease surveillance methods.
The standard data inputs for the main webpage are: news aggregators (such as Google
News, Yahoo News, Baidu), specific RSS feeds (WHO, OIE, FAO), constructed datasets of lan-
guage-specific RSS feeds, email subscriptions (GPHIN, ProMED, etc), custom-parsed HTML
scraping or CSV/XML feeds, and user submitted reports. HealthMap queries news aggregators
at regular intervals with a list of queries designed to return outbreak news stories with excellent
sensitivity while avoiding poor specificity. Post-collection processing ensures non-outbreak re-
lated articles are not displayed on the map. Specific RSS feeds and e-mail subscriptions allow
the system to receive high quality data from known providers. Custom-parsed scraping pro-
grams allow the system to retrieve data that is otherwise difficult to access.
User-submitted reports represent a diverse group of resources. Users may submit URLs or
eyewitness descriptions of outbreaks to HealthMap via the website, e-mail, telephone, text mes-
sage or the Outbreaks Near Me mobile app for Android and iPhone. These reports are pro-
cessed through various means depending on the method of delivery.
Social media sources are also included in HealthMap. Twitter and Facebook data are collect-
ed and processed by the parser. The short nature of tweets does present challenges to automat-
ed categorization, but enhanced dictionaries have helped to address that issue.
HealthMap subject matter domains. Although HealthMap was developed specifically to
provide a comprehensive real time display of infectious disease outbreak knowledge, the system
has proven flexible and robust enough to support many other projects. HealthMap has been
used in diverse government-sponsored and academic research-oriented projects including mon-
itoring violence against civilians in the Syrian conflict, and enhancing situation awareness for re-
sponse efforts for a natural disaster. The core architecture and processing capabilities are
language and subject matter independent. HealthMap is constantly expanding its language capa-
bilities. The core HealthMap languages have extensive language support: English, Spanish, Por-
tuguese, French, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic. More recently added language capabilities are
German, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, Malay and Indonesian. HealthMap also processes alerts
in Italian and Thai for specific projects. HealthMap aims to continue to adding language capabil-
ities to further expand its global coverage of hyper-local outbreaks. The relatively straightforward
process for adding languages demonstrate the flexibility of the underlying automated parser.
Study design and population
HealthMap data capture and analyses. HealthMap became operational for N.meningiti-
dis disease capture in 2010 and was used for this study to detect cases of meningococcal disease
and potential outbreaks in the US from 2010 to 2013. Heat maps were generated using the fol-
lowing search conditions: meningitis-Neisseria, United States, new & ongoing outbreaks, and
yearly intervals. Alerts reflect online information from news, expert-curated discussions, and
validated official reports (e.g., World Health Organization, ProMEDMail, and Google News
feeds that were active during this time interval). Alerts were individually crosschecked
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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manually to ensure they reflected confirmed cases of meningococcal disease with citation of
the appropriate state health departments or institutions. Accuracy of HealthMap capture was
calculated based on downloading all the citations and individually counting the alerts to verify
those capturing diagnoses, suspected cases, or general news.
An “alert” in HealthMap is defined as any unique data source, typically a unique URL link. If
the data source (i.e. Associated Press or Reuters) writes a story and 30 newspapers pick it up and
write slightly different versions, then the system receives all of those URLs as distinct alerts, but
the artificial intelligence of the system will group them together as having identical information
despite existing in different locations in the Internet. The term alert is used sometimes inter-
changeably as the presence of a case, but occasionally it could also be a warning.
Centers for Disease Control data capture and analyses. Traditional surveillance data
were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Active Bacterial Core surveil-
lance (ABCs) Emerging Infections Program Network [11] for N. meningitidis from 2005 (to
include assessment of the impact of vaccine introduction on disease incidence) to 2012
(most recent finalized report available online). Non-B serogroup and serogroup B case rates
per 100,000 population reflects ABCs figures in ten US states representing 39 to 43 million
inhabitants over eight years. Total cases in the US reflect CDC estimates based on applying
ABC case rate to US population census.
Results
The HealthMap meningitis system—increasing visibility of
meningococcal cases
Geographic distribution of HealthMap alerts in the US. Fig 1 illustrates the distribution
of HealthMap meningococcal alerts from 2010–2013 that are color-coded by year. The two
pink shaded circles represent country levels alerts indicated by HealthMap for 2013 due to
the serogroup B outbreaks at Princeton University and University of California Santa Bar-
bara. Compared to a retrospective surveillance study reviewing outbreaks from July 1994 to
Fig 1. HealthMap data for Neisseria meningitidis alerts from 2010 to 2013.Markers indicate state, province, or local alerts. The two pink-shaded circles
represent country-level alerts for 2013 due to the serogroup B outbreaks at University of California Santa Barbara and Princeton University. Image generated
using ZeeMaps. Reprinted under a CC BY license with permission from ZeeMaps.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g001
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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June 2002 [12], there is a similar geographic distribution of N.meningitidis disease activity in
HealthMap. The distribution of cases captured for the school setting (57.8%) and the commu-
nity setting (42.2%) by HealthMap alerts were similar to that reported previously in the set-
ting of N.meningitidis outbreaks (44.9% and 36.2%, respectively) [12]. Fig 2 is a breakdown
of state-specific HealthMap case alerts for N.meningitidis annually from beginning of 2010 to
end of 2013 (2010 = blue, 2011 = orange, 2012 = light grey, and 2013 = dark grey). From this
breakdown, it shows that 20 states represented the case alert activity captured by HealthMap
during this four-year period. The top-two states, by year, comprising the majority of internet-
based case alerts were Oklahoma/Colorado (12.0%/55.4%) in 2010, Colorado/Oregon (16.7%/
26.2%) in 2011, Oregon/California (34.6%/32.1%) in 2012, and California/New Jersey
(50.0%/32.6%) in 2013.
Fig 2. Number of HealthMapmeningococcal case alerts in twenty US states reporting disease activity from 2010–2013. The majority of internet-
based case alerts derived frommeningococcal disease activity in Oklahoma/Colorado (12.0% and 55.4% in 2010), Colorado/Oregon (16.7%/26.2% in 2011),
Oregon/California (34.6% and 32.1% in 2012), and California/New Jersey (50.0% and 32.6% in 2013). Bars indicate actual number of alerts. Blue color
indicates case alerts in 2010, orange color indicates case alerts in 2011, light grey color indicates case alerts in 2012, and dark grey color indicates case
alerts in 2013.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g002
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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Accuracy of HealthMap capture of meningococcal disease. Fig 3 includes information
on the specificity of the disease cases captured by the HealthMap automated search algorithm.
On average, 83.3% of reported cases identified by HealthMap represented diagnosed cases
(blue color), 10.5% represented suspected cases (orange color), and 5.6% were related news but
not actual cases of N.meningitidis (light grey color). Table 1 indicates the total cases captured
through internet data sources utilized by HealthMap for 2010–2013 (30, 28, 22, and 40 cases,
respectively) and illustrates that serogroup specific information for these cases was not avail-
able in 53.3%, 82.1%, 68.1%, and 52.5% of alerts.
Epidemiology of vaccine-preventable serogroup ACWY versus
serogroup B
Fig 4 illustrates the trend in meningococcal cases from 2005 to 2012 using ABCs surveillance
data obtained from the CDC surveillance for N.meningitidis [11]. ABCs surveillance reflects
ten US states representing 39 to 43 million inhabitants over eight years (Fig 5). There is a de-
cline of total cases (Fig 4, solid black line) in the ABCs states from 1,025 cases in 2005 to what
appears to be a plateau ranging from 475 to 620 cases during 2010 to 2012. The dotted blue
line indicates the decreasing trend in case rates per 100,000 persons (all age groups) for non-B
serogroups from 2007 to 2012. The dotted red line indicates a more variable trend in case rates
per 100,000 persons (all age groups) for the serogroup B that appears to show an increasing
trend since 2010. This variability in case rate for serogroup B is expected since the MenACWY
vaccine introduced in 2005 would not be protective against serogroup B. No deviation from
these trends occur when analyzing specifically case rates in 18–34 year old individuals (univer-
sity age group) as indicated for non-B serogroups (solid blue line) and serogroup B (solid red
line). Case rates from serogroup B meningococcus in children< 1 year of age were not includ-
ed but are oscillating at a much higher case rate than all other age groups with values between
Fig 3. Specificity of HealthMap case alerts for actualNeisseria meningitidis disease activity from
2010–2013. The specificity, on average, for HealthMap alerts during 2010 to 2013 were as follows: 83.3%
were diagnosed cases, 10.5% were suspected cases, and 5.6% were related news but not actual cases of
Neisseria meningitidis. Pie graphs illustrate percentages for alerts per year with numerical values indicating
actual number of alerts. Blue color indicates diagnosedNeisseria meningitidis, orange color indicates
suspectedNeisseria meningitidis, and light grey color indicates general information associated with
meningococcal disease (related news articles but not actual cases).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g003
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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Table 1. Meningococcal disease cases identified by HealthMap alerts.
Year School (# of cases) Community (# of cases) Alive / Dead Distribution
2010 Red Bluff, CALIFORNIA (1) Red Bluff/Tehama County, 16/14 Total = 30 cases
2010 Denver/Fort Collins, COLORADO CALIFORNIA (1B+1) B = 23%
(3C+1) Larimer County, COLORADO C = 23%
2010 Clare County, MICHIGAN (1) (4C+1B) Y = 0%
2010 Long Island, NEW YORK (1) Bullitt County, KENTUCKY (1) ? = 54%
2010 Athens/Franklin County, OHIO (4B) Franklin County, OHIO (1B)
2010 Oologah, OKLAHOMA (7)
2010 Roanoke College, VIRGINIA (1)
2010 Madison, WISCONSIN (2)
2011 Shasta County, CALIFORNIA (1) Craig, ALASKA (1) 19/9 Total = 28 cases
2011 Boulder, COLORADO (1) Fort Smith, ARKANSAS (1) B = 4%
2011 Washington, DISTRICT OF Los Angeles County, C = 7%
COLUMBIA (1) CALIFORNIA (7) Y = 7%
2011 Canton, NEW YORK (1) Larimer County, COLORADO ? = 82%
2011 Columbus, OHIO (2) (1Y)
2011 Norman, OKLAHOMA (1) Hillsborough/Broward
2011 Prinville, OREGON (1C) County, FLORIDA (2)
2011 Bethlehem, PENNSYLVANIA (1) Morgan County, OHIO (1)
2011 Caroline County, VIRGINIA (1) Bend/Prinville/Deschutes
2011 Greenbay, WISCONSIN (1) County, OREGON
(1C+1B+1Y+1)
2012 Sacramento/San Francisco/ Clearlake/Ukiah, CALIFORNIA 14/8 Total = 22 cases
San Diego, CALIFORNIA (3+1B) (2) B = 5%
2012 Tallahassee/Miami, FLORIDA (2) New York, NEW YORK (4C) C = 27%
2012 East Lansing/Traverse City, Pawnee County, OKLAHOMA Y = 0%
MICHIGAN (2) (1) ? = 68%
2012 St. Louis, MISSOURI (1) Prinville/Eugene, OREGON
2012 Prinville/Eugene, OREGON (1C+2)
(1C+2)
2013 Maricopa County, ARIZONA (1B) Navajo/Maricopa County 34/6 Total = 40 cases
2013 Petaluma/San Diego/Shasta ARIZONA (2B) B = 43%
County/Santa Barbara, Huntington Beach/San C = 5%
CALIFORNIA (3+5B) Diego/West Hollywood/ Y = 0%
2013 Chicago, ILLINOIS (1C) Willits, CALIFORNIA ? = 52%
2013 South Bend/Muncie, INDIANA (2) (6+1C)
2013 Princeton/West Long Branch, New York, NEW YORK (4)
NEW JERSEY (8B+1)
2013 Wester Chester/Reading/
University Park,
PENNSYLVANIA (4)
2013 Charlottesville, VIRGINIA (1B)
2013 Madison, WISCONSIN (1)
Example of community-identiﬁed and reported meningitis outbreaks in the United States in a four-year period. Based on the source of information and the
stage of the outbreak, HealthMap is able to provide geographical and numerical information on cases and also displays information related to disease-
causing serotype (when available).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.t001
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1.0 to 2.9 cases per 100,000 population compared to non-B serogroups that range from 0.6 to
1.2 cases per 100,000 population.
Detecting HealthMap signals across national borders for emerging N.
meningitidis threats
Fig 6 is an illustration of a close-up view from HealthMap illustrating the multiple N.meningi-
tidis alerts for Southern California for 2013 including one in San Diego referring to a meningi-
tis outbreak in Tijuana, Mexico [13]. What becomes readily apparent from the image is the
proximity of Tijuana to the southern border of the United States. In the first three months of
2013, there had been 17 cases (including six deaths) in Tijuana [13]. If the Tijuana outbreak
cases were counted as US cases, this would increase the total number of cases for 2013 from 40
to 57 patients (Table 1). In Fig 7, HealthMap is illustrating N.meningitidis disease alerts global-
ly and illustrates N.meningitidis disease activity near the northern border of the United States
with Canada (involving cities in British Columbia and Ontario). Of the eight cases captured by
HealthMap in Canada between 2010 to 2013, the bordering cities reported one case in a student
in Western Ontario (2010), one death in a student in Hamilton (2010), and one death in a stu-
dent in Vancouver Island (2012).
Fig 4. Invasivemeningococcal disease (IMD) reported over the past eight years by Active Bacterial Core Surveillance. Data plotted from Active
Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs) Emerging Infections Program Network (states highlighted in white). There is a decline of total cases (solid black line) in
the ABCs states from 1,025 cases in 2005 to what appears to be a plateau ranging from 475 to 620 cases during 2010 to 2012. The dotted blue line indicates
the decreasing trend in case rates per 100,000 persons (all age groups) for non-B serogroups from 2007 to 2012. The dotted red line indicates a more
variable trend in case rates per 100,000 persons (all age groups) for the serogroup B that appears to show an increasing trend since 2010. This variability in
case rate for serogroup B is expected since the MenACWY vaccine introduced in 2005 would not be protective against serogroup B. No deviation from these
trends occur when analyzing specifically case rates in 18–34 year old individuals (university age group) as indicated for non-B serogroups (solid blue line)
and serogroup B (solid red line). Case rates for serogroup B meningococcus in children < 1 year of age are not shown but are oscillating at a much higher
case rate than all other age groups with values between 1.0 to 2.9 cases per 100,000 population compared to non-B serogroups that range from 0.6 to 1.2
cases per 100,000 population.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g004
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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“Connecting the dots” to disease transmission using HealthMap
Fig 8 is an example of how real-time informatics can be used to connect what appear to be unre-
lated meningococcal disease cases (due to serogroup C) that differ by state, city, site, and time.
The data indicate one death in April (Metropolitan State University student in Denver,
Fig 5. Population under suveillance by ABC for Neisseria meningitidis (adapted from CDCwebsite).
Non-B serogroup and serogroup B case rates reflects ABCs figures in ten US states (white shading of entire
state indicates that total state population under surveillance while white shaded circle indicates that
population of certain counties within the state are under surveillance). Numbers of inhabitants being followed
per state are as follows: CT = 3,590,347; GA = 9,919,945; MD = 5,884,563; MN = 5,379,139;
NM = 2,085,538; OR = 3,899,353; TN = 3,872,994 (20 urban counties); CA = 3,460,180 (3 county Bay area);
CO = 2,532,982 (5 county Denver area); NY = 2,178,020 (7 county Rochester area and 8 county Albany
area). Total population under surveillance by ABCs is 42,803,061.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g005
Fig 6. Local view of HealthMap data for Neisseria meningitidis alerts from 2010 to 2013.Multiple alerts in Southern California including one in San
Diego refering to a meningitis outbreak across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. Marker color (light orange to darker purple) reflects increasing significance
assigned by HealthMap users or news volume associated with the alert. Each marker may represent more than oneNeisseria meningitidis alert (as seen in
the break-out box). What becomes readily apparent from the image is the proximity of Tijuana to the southern border of the United States. In the first three
months of 2013, there had been 17 cases (including six deaths) in Tijuana. Individuals today are more mobile than before which underscores the relevance of
disease activity awareness in cities bordering countries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g006
Neisseria meningitidis and HealthMap
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Colorado), two survivors and one death between May and December (Colorado State Universi-
ty students at Fort Collins, Colorado), two deaths and one survivor between June and August
(two men and one child in Fort Collins, Colorado), and one death in October (a man in Great
Falls, Montana). Using the news data captured with HealthMap, what becomes apparent is that
the disease transmission may have started at a college party in Boulder, Colorado attended by
the student from Denver who died. This party was also attended by Colorado State University
(CSU) students from Fort Collins. While it is not clear whether the three CSU students infected
with meningococcus serogroup C attended the party in Boulder, the infection in one of the
three students predated the infection resulting in the death of two men and the hospitalization
of one child in Fort Collins. The infected child was related to one of the two men who died.
These two men were players in a hockey match in June (which CSU students attended), and the
man dying four months later in Great Falls, Montana was also a player in this hockey match.
Discussion
Real-Time “snapshot” of meningococcal disease activity by HealthMap
Surveillance monitoring systems based on Internet news can provide new dynamics to public
health data analysis and, as illustrated in the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic, help to over-
come certain limitations of existing public health surveillance systems including reporting de-
lays, inconsistent population coverage, and poor accuracy in detecting emerging diseases. The
Fig 7. Global view of HealthMap data for Neisseria meningitidis alerts from 2010 to 2013.Multiple alerts globally including Neisseria meningococcus
activity near the northern border of the US with Canada (cities in British Columbia and Ontario). Marker color (light orange to darker red) indicates increasing
newsworthiness. Smaller marker size reflects local alert for city, state, or province while larger marker size reflects a country-level alert. Of the eight cases
captured by HealthMap in Canada between 2010 to 2013, the bordering cities reported one case in a student in Western Ontario (2010), one death in a
student in Hamilton (2010), and one death in a student in Vancouver Island (2012). HealthMap disease activity across borders could contribute to
understanding disease transmission and subsequent outbreaks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g007
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current university-linked serogroup B outbreaks in 2013–2014 and the serogroup B outbreaks
described previously in Oregon from 1994–1996 and in Ohio in 2010 [14] highlight the unpre-
dictable nature of N.meningitidis outbreaks and the challenges facing public officials who need
to rapidly identify whether an outbreak is occurring and trigger the necessary intervention to
treat and prevent disease transmission. Given the historical data available for comparison and
the recent advancement in the capabilities of informatics, we used HealthMap, an automated
text processing system that collects data from diverse online sources including media reports
and health department press releases, to detect cases of meningococcal disease and potential
outbreaks in the US from 2010 to 2013. HealthMap application to emerging diseases was previ-
ously proven during the global surveillance monitoring of H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009
[5]. This real-time informatics system captured a national distribution of meningitis cases (Fig
1) and increased prevalence for school-based settings (Table 1) similar to what has been pub-
lished in an older US study using traditional and more comprehensive surveillance [12]. While
the Internet-based data streaming approach used by HealthMap underestimates US disease
burden (Table 1) when compared to estimates from ABCs (Fig 4), it is a very rapid method for
acquiring a snapshot of meningococcal disease visibility as a function of time (Figs 2 and 3).
Predicting when a sporadic case will evolve into an outbreak of the proportions seen at Prince-
ton, New Jersey, and Santa Barbara, California, remains problematic with traditional surveil-
lance and could be bridged by the application of real-time informatics such as HealthMap.
Fig 8. Understanding disease transmission from disease alerts in HealthMap. The figure illustrates on the y-axis the geographic location from south to
north and on the x-axis, monthly intervals between April and December of 2010. The circles indicate survivors of meningococcal infection while the cross-
marks indicate deaths. Data captured from real-time informatics trace eight subjects infected with Neisseria meningococcus back to possible disease
initiation at a college party in Boulder, Colorado, with subsequent amplification at a hockey match in Fort Collins, Colorado, two months later.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127406.g008
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Detailed epidemiology captured by traditional surveillance systems
The real-time informatics approach used by HealthMap has been active since 2006 and its ca-
pacities have evolved significantly for disease monitoring [15–22] with the addition of data
capture for N.meningitidis being fully operational as of 2010. However, internet-based data
streaming cannot yet provide the level of epidemiological detail captured by traditional surveil-
lance approaches which have also investigated patterns in meningococcal disease historically.
Traditional surveillance has demonstrated that, since 1991, the frequency of local meningococ-
cal outbreaks has increased with the majority of cases being due to serogroup C [23]. Since
1997, local outbreaks due to serogroups Y and B have also been reported [23]. A study pub-
lished in 2006 characterized outbreak-associated and sporadic cases in the US during an eight-
year period from 1994 through 2002 and identified 69 outbreaks (3–14 outbreaks per year) in-
volving 229 patients from 30 states [12]. For all outbreaks, serogroup C was predominant
(66.4%) followed by B (23.6%), Y (10.0%), and W (0%). During the same period, sporadic cases
were predominantly caused by serogroup B (36.7%), followed by Y (32.5%), C (28.6%), and W
(2.2%) [12]. This 2006 publication [12] concluded that 1) outbreak-associated cases were more
likely to die compared to sporadic disease cases, 2) outbreak-associated cases most often in-
volved serogroup C, and 3) institutional outbreaks generally last less than two weeks.
However, in the case of the 2013 outbreaks involving Princeton University and University
of California Santa Barbara, the serogroup involved was meningococcus B and these institu-
tional outbreaks persisted for months as captured by HealthMap data-streaming. These recent
outbreaks suggests a change in meningococcal serogroup distribution which could be expected
due to the introduction of vaccines protective against A, C, W, and Y (decreasing incidence of
non-serogroup B meningococcus captured by ABCs in Fig 4). Since the peak of meningococcal
disease in the 1990s in the US, disease incidence has decreased to 0.2 cases per 100,000 popula-
tion in all age groups in 2011 [24]. The burden of disease is highest among infants younger
than 1 year of age (2.6 cases per 100,000 persons), adolescents 16 to 21 years of age (0.4 cases
per 100,000 persons), and adults older than 65 years of age (0.3 cases per 100,000 persons)
[24]. While serogroups B, C, and Y are each responsible for approximately one third of menin-
gococcal cases in the US, the proportion caused by each serogroup varies by age group. For ex-
ample, 60% of disease in children younger than 60 months of age is caused by serogroup B.
However, 73% of disease in persons aged 11 years is caused by serogroup C, Y, or W. While
no serogroup B vaccine is licensed in the US for children younger than 60 months of age, quad-
rivalent meningococcal glycoconjugate vaccines protective against serogroups A, C, W, and Y
(MenACWY) have been licensed in the US since 2005 [24]. MenACWY vaccine coverage has
increased to over 70% by 2011 in adolescents 13 to 17 years of age [24] with the estimated
number of annual cases from serogroups C and Y decreasing by 75% in individuals 11 to 14
years of age from 2000–2004 to 2005–2009 [23]. However, for individuals 15 to 18 years of age,
serogroup C and Y cases have decreased only by 27% and a peak in meningococcal disease has
persisted among persons aged 18 to 21 years [23].
Using informatics to put into context emerging N.meningitidis disease
threats and related public health interventions
The ability of informatics-based approaches to filter through local, national, and global disease
activity in real-time provides another feature not readily apparent from traditional surveillance
approaches—modes of disease transmission. Individuals today are more mobile than before
which underscores the relevance of disease activity awareness in cities bordering countries.
From Fig 7, it becomes apparent that HealthMap disease activity across borders could contrib-
ute to understanding disease transmission and subsequent outbreaks. As an example, the
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HealthMap alerts for Southern California in 2013 brought to attention a meningitis outbreak
in Tijuana, Mexico (Fig 6). According to the San Diego Deputy Public Health director, the out-
break in Tijuana in 2013 was three times the incidence seen in Tijuana annually [13]. Tijuana
is the largest city in the Mexican state of Baja California and is situated on the US-Mexico bor-
der adjacent to San Diego, California. This is the most traversed international border in the
world [25] with the two border crossing stations in Tijuana accounting for an estimated
300,000 border crossings each day. Notably, a subsequent epidemiological study on meningo-
coccal disease in Latin America from 1945 to 2010 demonstrated that serogroup A has virtually
disappeared, and that serogroups B and C are responsible for most cases [26]. The disease ac-
tivity captured by HealthMap for Canadian cities (Fig 7) near the US border reflected only two
cases in 2010 and one case in 2012 that may be reflecting the timely incorporation of vaccines
into the national schedules by Health Canada. The quadrivalent conjugated vaccine protective
for A,C,W,Y was licensed in Canada in 2007 [27] and, more recently, a recombinant serogroup
B vaccine was approved on January 2014 [28].
N.meningitidis outbreaks: potential of internet-based data streaming to
de-convolute disease transmission or capture intervention-related
signals
The unpredictable nature of meningococcal outbreaks and the protracted timeline during
which enough cases accumulate to trigger declaration of an outbreak were recently highlighted
by the serogroup B meningococcus university-linked outbreaks that occurred on both the east
and west coasts of the US in 2013. More recently, on March 10, 2014, a student at Drexel Uni-
versity died from serogroup B meningococcal disease. CDC laboratory analysis, based on ge-
netic fingerprinting, demonstrated that the strain infecting this student matched that in the
Princeton University outbreak. This student had been in close contact with students from
Princeton University about a week before illness, and the laboratory analysis indicated that the
outbreak strain may still be present in the Princeton community and require vigilance for addi-
tional cases [29]. These university outbreaks highlight the limitations of antibiotic chemopro-
phylaxis interventions that require the identification and treatment of all individuals at risk in
order to avoid subsequent disease transmission by untreated carriers of subclinical disease.
This was evidenced during a serogroup B outbreak in a hotel [30] and another in a middle
school [31] in 1995. However, real-time capture of cases by internet-based informatics can
complement traditional surveillance monitoring approaches leading to increasing confidence
and resourcing in outbreak settings by decreasing time to outbreak declaration and medical
handling. As illustrated in Fig 8, modes of disease transmission could be traced to ensure tar-
geted administration of antibiotic therapy or prophylactic interventions to the relevant at-risk
population. Finally, internet-based monitoring systems like HealthMap can provide a real-time
channel for patients to report intervention-related failures or can be applied to safety data min-
ing by scanning social media channels like Twitter and Facebook on a macro-level for patient-
reported safety insights. This could include the direct reporting to regulatory authorities of
medication or vaccine-associated adverse events identified through social media and mobile
phone apps. These widely accessible and user-friendly computer-based options can support the
tracking of subject safety and could facilitate decision-making related to the use of unlicensed
therapies or vaccines in emergency situations. One such emergency situation was the Princeton
University serogroup B meningococcal disease outbreak that began in the US in March 2013.
An emergency vaccination campaign with an imported vaccine (Bexsero, approved in Austra-
lia, Europe, and Canada but not in the US) was able to be implemented in the US in December
2013 (approximately nine months later) only under special regulatory procedures after the
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CDC filed an Investigational New Drug application with the Food and Drug Administration
requesting special permission for use [32].
With regards to invasive meningococcal disease (IMD), a potential limitation of using
HealthMap may be related to the inability to identify and report the serotypes specifically linked
to the disease outbreak. Traditionally, all US states have mandated reporting of IMD [33] and re-
quire health care providers to immediately report suspected cases to assure rapid identification
of close contacts and administration of antibiotic prophylaxis [23]. However, despite the swift
execution of the protocol established to confirm these reports, there is always a window of delay
secondary to the specialized public health molecular and microbiological laboratory testing nec-
essary to confirm cases in establish IMD clusters. Usually, during an outbreak, the high case
rates increase awareness in health authorities, but options for implementing the best tailored,
prophylactic measure requires understanding the extent and mode of transmission involved in
that particular outbreak. A national network of state epidemiologists and CDCmaintain regular
communication on the outbreak status through electronic alerts over the secure CDC Epi-X sys-
tem and direct communication between states when out-of-state exposures occur.
Conclusions
International events with the potential to cross borders (e.g., 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza)
are probably the best example of the application of HealthMap and highlight its potential use
for other emerging worldwide threats (e.g., SARS, avian influenza, or Ebola virus). The under-
reporting of disease cases by internet-based data streaming in specific N.meningitidis outbreak
modes makes inadequate any comparison to epidemiological data captured by more compre-
hensive traditional N.meningitidis surveillance such as the ABCs network published by the
CDC. However, the natural delays in compiling reports from traditional surveillance (at the
time of writing, ABCs N.meningitidis data for 2013 is listed as being provisional) emphasize
the utility of real-time internet-based data streaming for providing a real-time “snapshot” of
meningococcal disease. In this investigation on surveillance of N.meningitidis disease activity
and transmission using the HealthMap information tool, what becomes apparent is that this
information technology can complement epidemiological data captured by traditional surveil-
lance monitoring systems by quickly filling gaps (including the visualization of modes of me-
ningococcal disease transmission in outbreaks) allowing for better resource and action
planning. For the general public and the public health community, HealthMap surveillance of
meningococcal disease activity can increase disease awareness by collecting an immense
amount of disease/outbreak reports and putting them in a widely accessible and user-friendly
platform. This user-friendly platform of HealthMap has the potential to additionally comple-
ment traditional surveillance monitoring by serving as an internet-based real-time channel for
patients infected with N.meningitidis to report intervention-related failures.
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